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THE ECONOMICS OF KIRTSAENG V. JOHN WILEY
& SONS, INC.: THE EFFICIENCY OF A
BALANCED APPROACH TO THE FIRST SALE
DOCTRINE
Guy A. Rub*
INTRODUCTION
Can a buyer of copyrighted works abroad import them to the United
States? Can the owner of such items resell them domestically? Does the
answer to the first inquiry dictate the answer to the second? These
important questions, which relate to the scope of the first sale doctrine in
copyright law, are currently pending before the Supreme Court in Kirtsaeng
v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.1
The parties’ positions in this case as well as the Justices’ questions
during oral argument included an extensive inquiry into the significant
economic effects of the Court’s potential rulings. This Essay shows that the
economic analysis to date, however, is seriously incomplete. This Essay
will suggest that the defendant’s and plaintiff’s positions are economically
unsound and that a more balanced approach—possibly the one offered by
the Solicitor General—would better promote the public welfare.
The defendant-petitioner urges the Supreme Court to adopt a rule that
allows buyers of copyrighted works abroad to freely import and resell these
works in the United States.2 After a short background on the significance
of Kirtsaeng, Part II analyzes the undesirable economic effects of this
position, if adopted. These effects, that to date have not been fully
considered, include a material decrease in the incentives to create
copyrighted works and a potential for severe harm to buyers in developing
countries.
The plaintiff-respondent, by contrast, seeks a rule, adopted by the Second
Circuit,3 which prohibits the unlicensed importation and resale of copies of

* Assistant Professor of Law, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law. I would
like to thank Doug Berman, Ariel Katz, Peter Swire, and Chris Walker for their valuable
comments and Ingrid Mattson for research assistance. All remaining errors are, of course,
my own.
1. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., No. 11-697 (U.S. argued Oct. 29, 2012).
2. See Brief for Petitioner at 5–6, Kirtsaeng, No. 11-697 (U.S. July 2, 2012)
[hereinafter Petitioner’s Brief].
3. See John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Kirtsaeng, 654 F.3d 210, 224 (2d Cir. 2011), cert.
granted, 132 S. Ct. 1905 (2012).
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copyrighted works manufactured abroad.4 During oral argument, the
economic impacts of this rule were referred to as a “parade of horribles,”
but the analysis of these effects was lacking.5 A closer analysis, offered in
Part III, reveals that while the adverse economic impacts of this position are
not as severe as first thought, the concerns in some cases are real. This
analysis shows that adopting this rule would further increase the already
high transaction costs in resale markets and, thus, would create a chilling
effect on these markets.
This Essay fills an important gap in the economic analysis to date. Once
the adverse economic effects of the defendant’s and plaintiff’s positions are
appreciated, the economic significance of Kirtsaeng becomes clearer.
Part IV explains why a balanced approached, which would impose a
license requirement for importation of copyrighted works but not for their
resale in the United States, might be a preferable solution. A somewhat
similar outcome was favored by the Solicitor General and by the Ninth
Circuit, although both justified their positions on other grounds and did not
fully appreciate the economic principles at play. With the support offered
by this new economic insight, the Solicitor General’s position deserves
even closer attention by the Court.
I. BACKGROUND: THE FIRST SALE DOCTRINE AND THE IMPORTANCE OF
KIRTSAENG V. JOHN WILEY & SONS, INC.
Supap Kirtsaeng moved from Thailand to the United States to attend
Cornell University. In order to finance his studies Kirtsaeng asked his
friends and family to buy English textbooks in Thailand and send them to
him. These books, sold in Thailand for a fraction of their price in the
United States, were sold by Kirtsaeng on websites such as eBay.
Kirtsaeng’s proceeds in the two years in which he was in business exceeded
$1 million.6
Kirtsaeng was sued by John Wiley & Sons, a publisher of textbooks, for
copyright infringement.7 The Copyright Act grants several exclusive rights
to copyright owners including the exclusive rights to distribute copyrighted
works and to import them into the United States8—rights that were
allegedly infringed by Kirtsaeng. Kirtsaeng based his defense on section
109(a) of the Copyright Act, which codifies the principle known as the first
sale doctrine.9 According to section 109(a), notwithstanding the exclusive
4. See Brief for Respondent at 6, Kirtsaeng, No. 11-697 (U.S. Aug. 31, 2012)
[hereinafter Respondent’s Brief].
5. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 28–32, 36–39, Kirtsaeng, No. 11-697 (U.S.
Oct. 29, 2012) [hereinafter Transcript], available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_
arguments/argument_transcripts/11-697.pdf.
6. The facts of the case are drawn from and explored in greater detail in the Second
Circuit’s opinion. See Kirstaeng, 654 F.3d at 213–14.
7. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Kirtsaeng, CIV.A.08CIV.7834DCP, 2009 WL 3364037
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2009).
8. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(3), 602(a) (2006).
9. Id. § 109(a).
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rights of the copyright owner, an owner of a copy of copyrighted work (e.g.,
the owner of a CD or a book) “lawfully made under this title” is allowed “to
sell or otherwise dispose of the possession” of that copy.10 In Quality King
Distributors, Inc. v. L’anza Research International, Inc.,11 the last Supreme
Court opinion dealing with the first sale doctrine, the Court held that this
defense also applies to the importation of copyrighted goods.12 Thus, if the
conditions of section 109(a) are met, importation of copyrighted goods does
not require a license.
The trial court rejected Kirtsaeng’s attempt to use the first sale doctrine
as a defense.13 The Second Circuit affirmed and held that the term
“lawfully made under this title,” as used in section 109(a), means
manufactured in the United States.14 Because the items imported and
resold by Kirtsaeng were manufactured in Thailand, the defense did not
apply and thus he was found liable for copyright infringement and was
ordered to pay $600,000 in statutory damages.
The main question before the Supreme Court is whether the first sale
doctrine defense applies to copies manufactured abroad. If, as the
defendant argues, it does, then arguably the importation and resale of goods
manufactured abroad and protected by copyright is legal, and Kirtsaeng is
not liable. If, as suggested by the plaintiff, the defense does not apply to
goods manufactured abroad, then both the importation and resale of those
goods require a license from the copyright owner, and therefore Kirtsaeng,
who did not secure such a license, is liable.
The Solicitor General’s position is more complex. On one hand, he
argues that the first sale doctrine defense should not apply with respect to
importation of goods manufactured abroad into the United State, and
therefore, unless another defense applies, the importer of copyrighted works
must secure a license.15 In addition, however, the Solicitor General claims
that Supreme Court precedent16 provides a broad defense from copyright
infringement once items are being sold domestically.17 This outcome is
similar to the rule adopted by the Ninth Circuit.18

10. Id.
11. Quality King Distrib., Inc. v. L’anza Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135 (1998).
12. Id. at 151–52.
13. See John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Kirstaeng, 654 F.3d, 210, 214 (2d Cir. 2011).
14. See id. at 224.
15. Brief for United States As Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 27–29,
Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., No. 11-697 (U.S. Sept. 7, 2012) [hereinafter Brief for
the United States].
16. See Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908).
17. Brief for the United States, supra note 15, at 27–29.
18. See, e.g., Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 541 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2008),
aff’d by an equally divided court, 131 S.Ct. 565 (2010).
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II. WHAT IF THE DEFENDANT’S POSITION IS ADOPTED? LIMITATIONS ON
MARKET SEGMENTATION AND REDUCTION IN THE INCENTIVES TO CREATE
The defendant in Kirtsaeng argues that adopting the plaintiff’s position
will cause “a parade of horribles.”19 Can the plaintiff offer his own parade
of horribles if the defendant’s position is adopted? I believe that to a degree
it can, because such a ruling might make geographic market segmentation
difficult. This part of the Essay presents the practice of geographic market
segmentation and explains why the defendant’s position is inconsistent with
it. Next, it analyzes the complex and mostly adverse effects of eliminating
geographic market segmentation, which include reducing the incentives to
create and harming buyers in developing countries.
A. The Defendant’s Position Is Inconsistent with the Practice of
Geographic Price Discrimination
Market segmentation, which is also called price discrimination, is a
pricing scheme by which the seller of a good (in this case, a copyrighted
work) attempts to use the heterogeneity in her buyers’ attributions—and in
particular in their willingness to pay—and offer the product at different
prices to different buyers.20
There are several ways to achieve such market segmentation. One way,
called a third-degree price discrimination, separates the buyers based on
some exogenous attributions. An example for this scheme is charging a
lower movie ticket price to senior citizens. In Kirtsaeng, the practice at
question is a third-degree price discrimination that is based on geographic
location. More specifically, the practice is to charge a lower price to buyers
in developing countries and a higher price to buyers in developed
countries.21 Such a scheme can work only as long as arbitrage between
those two markets—buying items in developing countries and reselling
them in a developed country—is limited in scope. The defendant,
Kirtsaeng, engaged in such international arbitrage. Therefore, when
deciding whether the plaintiff has a valid copyright cause of action against
Kirtsaeng, the Court will rule on the effectiveness of geographic market
segmentation.
At the outset, it is important to note that a win by the defendant will not
necessarily eliminate geographic market segmentation altogether. It is more

19. See Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 2, at 55–59. It was however the plaintiff who first
referred to this argument a “parade of horribles.” Respondent’s Brief, supra note 4, at 49.
The term was later used during oral argument. See Transcript, supra note 5.
20. I explored the practice of price discrimination in copyrighted works, at length, in the
context of contracts and copyright, in Guy A. Rub, Contracting Around Copyright: The
Uneasy Case for Unbundling of Rights in Creative Works, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 257 (2011).
21. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-806, COLLEGE TEXTBOOKS:
ENHANCED OFFERINGS APPEAR TO DRIVE RECENT PRICE INCREASES 21–25 (2005), available
at www.gao.gov/new.items/d05806.pdf. Geographic market segmentation is especially
valuable internationally (as compared to within one country) because the differences in the
demand and market size between various countries might be significant.
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likely that it will incentivize some copyright owners to use less efficient
ways to achieve market segmentation. One way to do this is to switch to a
second-degree price-discrimination scheme (also called versioning) in
which the seller offers various versions of the product, hoping that buyers
with high willingness to pay will voluntarily choose to buy the more
expensive one.
In this case, it is not difficult to imagine ways in which the plaintiff will
implement such market segmentation. For example, John Wiley & Sons
can offer different versions of a casebook for different prices. The most upto-date versions will be offered for a higher price and will naturally be sold
for that price in developed countries, including the United States. Older
versions will be sold for a cheaper price in developing countries, such as
Thailand. This scheme (and many other similar schemes can be envisioned,
including licensing nontransferable digital versions of textbooks instead of
selling actual books) might put the likes of Kirtsaeng out of business:
practically all students in the United States need the newest version of the
books used by their professors, and thus, the demand for cheaper old
textbooks, sold abroad, will be low.
Switching to new distribution models, however, has real costs beyond the
elimination of arbitrage. For example, the scheme suggested above adds
administrative costs for keeping two versions in print and causes disutility
to students in developing countries who will use old versions of textbooks.
Overall, while John Wiley & Sons can maintain some market segmentation
even if it were to lose in Kirtsaeng, it clearly prefers the current scheme to
create such segmentation.
In other cases, implementing an alternative market segmentation scheme
might be even more difficult. This is especially true in those common cases
in which the seller finds it difficult to create a cheap version of the product
that buyers in developed countries are not interested in buying. Music and
software CDs are two good examples.
B. Is Geographic Market Segmentation Socially Desirable?
What are the implications of seriously limiting or even eliminating
geographic market segmentation? In Quality King the Court noted that
prohibiting unlicensed importation (in that case, of copyrighted works
manufactured in the United States and first sold abroad) “would merely
inhibit access to ideas without any countervailing benefit.”22 This
supposition is clearly wrong. Nobody can reasonably argue that there are
absolutely no advantages to geographic market segmentation. In fact, a
closer look reveals that while the cost-benefit analysis of this practice is
complex, in the long run it is probably socially desirable.
As I have shown elsewhere,23 the economic impacts of eliminating
market segmentation vary from one market to another. In many cases, if
22. Quality King Distrib., Inc. v. L’anza Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 151 (1998).
23. Rub, supra note 20, at 266–71.
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forced to charge a uniform price, the copyright owner will need to decide
whether to sell the work for a cheaper price to a larger market or for a
higher price to a smaller market. Sellers actually make those choices
routinely.
If the result of eliminating market segmentation is a cheap uniform price,
then buyers in developed countries will be much better off, while buyers in
developing countries will be slightly worse off (as it is almost certain that
the uniform price will be at least somewhat more expensive than the price
in developing countries under a well-functioning market segmentation
scheme). Total buyers’ surplus will likely increase. If the result of
eliminating market segmentation is a high uniform price, then buyers in
developed countries will be only marginally better off—if at all—while the
buyers in developing countries will be completely priced out of the market.
The deadweight loss—the waste that results from pricing out of the market
those buyers who are willing to pay more than the marginal cost of
production but less than the uniform price—as well as the harm to thirdworld buyers will therefore be significant. Total buyers’ surplus will
decrease.
In both cases, if geographic market segmentation is eliminated, the
producer’s surplus—the surplus of the copyright owner—will decrease.
This result is certain because the copyright owner otherwise would not have
implemented a market segmentation approach in the first place.
Several conclusions can be drawn from this analysis. The first
conclusion, and probably the most significant one, is that as the producer’s
surplus shrinks so do the incentives to create.24 The copyright owner is
denied a revenue stream that the market segmentation gives her, and thus
those creators whose expected revenues can barely cover the cost of
creation might decide not to create. Eliminating market segmentation might
therefore adversely affect the number and quality of works created.
Another interesting result is that, in the short run, eliminating market
segmentation can severely harm buyers in developing countries who will
face a price increase. The parties in Kirtsaeng, as well as the panels of the
Second and Ninth Circuits, questioned what interpretation of the first sale
doctrine would result in extraterritorial expansion of U.S. copyright law.25
The analysis in this part provides an interesting angle as to the international
impact of a possible win by the defendant: as the United States is a major
market for copyrighted goods, a decision by the Supreme Court that would
make importation and resale of copyrighted goods in the United States
easier might severely harm buyers in developing countries.
The final conclusion has to do with buyers in the United States. In many
cases, the total effect of eliminating geographic market segmentation on
24. See id. at 273–75.
25. See, e.g., John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Kirtsaeng, 654 F.3d 210, 219 (2d Cir. 2011);
Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 541 F.3d 982, 987–88 (9th Cir. 2008), aff’d by an
equally divided court, 131 S.Ct. 565 (2010); Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 2, at 46–48;
Respondent’s Brief, supra note 4, at 16–17.

2013]

THE ECONOMICS OF KIRTSAENG

47

U.S. buyers—and in particular whether they can expect a price decrease—is
unclear. In some other cases, the results might be more obvious. The
market at issue in Kirtsaeng (i.e., textbooks in English), might be one such
example. It is extremely unlikely that the size of this market in developing
countries will cause John Wiley & Sons or other publishers to choose a
uniform cheap price for those textbooks. It is far more likely that, as the
majority of native English speakers in the world live in the United States26
(and more than 90 percent in developed countries),27 the publishers will
choose a high price—similar or maybe identical to the current price in the
United States. This high uniform price would make the purchase of new
English language textbooks in developing countries impractical. Therefore,
while the defendant in Kirtsaeng seems to suggest that his position helps
students in the United States overcome the rising costs of college
education,28 winning the case is unlikely to provide much help to those
students: if massive international arbitrage is allowed, the price will
probably be high worldwide.
III. WHAT IF THE PLAINTIFF’S POSITION IS ADOPTED? THE PARADE OF
HORRIBLES AND THE HARM TO RESALE MARKETS
During oral argument, several of the Justices focused on what the parties
referred to as a “parade of horribles.”29 The parade of horribles includes a
long list of allegedly absurd outcomes that will result from limiting the first
sale doctrine to goods manufactured in the United States, as suggested by
the plaintiff. Many believe that this argument might play a significant role
in the Court’s eventual reasoning.
Is the parade of horribles really that troubling? Closer analysis reveals
that these concerns are real, although probably exaggerated. The concerns
are exaggerated for two reasons: Some of the scenarios described are not
really horrible but are just a cost of market segmentation. Other suggested
horrible outcomes are unlikely in a market economy. However, the analysis
shows that adopting the plaintiff’s position can create some “horrible”
results by increasing the already high transaction costs in resale markets.
A. Are All the Horribles Really That Horrible?
The Cost of Market Segmentation
Some of the alleged horribles are not self-evidently horrible but seem
more like a reasonable cost of the copyright system and, in particular,
market segmentation. The issue before the Court is how broadly to
interpret a certain exception to some exclusive rights of copyright owners.
This decision will naturally affect the so-called “delicate balance” between
26. DAVID CRYSTAL, THE CAMBRIDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA
(2d ed. 2003).
27. Id.
28. Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 2, at 7.
29. See Transcript, supra note 5.
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incentives and access—but many copyright cases do just that.30 If a court
decides to interpret an exclusive right broadly or to interpret a defense
narrowly, the copyright owner will naturally gain a benefit over the
copyright users. That, in itself, might not be horrible. It is true that those
who currently engage in international arbitrage—for example, Kirtsaeng
and his family or Costco, which buys goods, sometimes protected by
copyright, for a cheap price abroad and sells them in the United States—
will obviously be adversely affected by a ruling for the plaintiff.
Nevertheless, at the same time, copyright owners—like John Wiley & Sons
or software companies—will experience an increase in their profits. Does
that tradeoff clearly make this result “horrible”? I argue no.
For example, the fact that Kirtsaeng supplies cheap textbooks to students
that might be struggling with the high cost of college education does not
necessarily mean, as the defendant implicitly argues, that the law should
protect such an activity. First and foremost, as mentioned above,31 even if
Kirtsaeng wins, it is unlikely that it will allow many students in developed
countries to buy cheap textbooks in English. Moreover, taken to the
extreme, this line of argument can logically justify abolishing copyright law
altogether, because this will clearly and quite dramatically reduce the price
of textbooks. This is, of course, a silly argument. Most will agree that
without copyright law the long-term incentives to create textbooks will be
inefficiently too low. The issue, therefore, is one that is at the heart of
copyright law itself—the tradeoff between incentives and access. It is thus
not self-evident that strengthening the copyright owner’s control over her
work, which sometimes might cause a price increase and a reduction in
access to existing copyrighted works, is undesirable.32 By the way, the
same can be said with respect to those companies that facilitate the resale
markets, such as eBay. Of course eBay prefers a broad first sale defense,33
as it will increase the volume of transactions on its site. But wouldn’t
abolishing copyright altogether increase, in the short run, the volume of
trades too?
B. The Market Ability To Resolve Some Horrible Results
The second problem with the parade-of-horribles argument is that it fails
to take into account the ability of the market to fix some legal predicaments.
This is best explained with the following example, first mentioned in the

30. See generally Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429
(1984); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright’s Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49
VAND. L. REV. 483, 492–98 (1996).
31. See supra Part II.B.
32. For an interesting analysis of how some of the basic questions in copyright law can
be framed in terms of fostering and limiting price discrimination, see Wendy J. Gordon,
Intellectual Property As Price Discrimination: Implications for Contract, 73 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1367 (1998).
33. See Brief for eBay, Inc. et al. As Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 5–6,
Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., No. 11-697 (U.S. July 9, 2012).
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defendant’s briefs34 and later raised during oral argument in a question by
Justice Breyer to Ted Olson, plaintiff’s counsel: “[I]magine Toyota . . . .
They have copyrighted sound systems. They have copyrighted GPS
systems . . . . now, this is one of their [i.e., the defendant’s] horribles . . . .
Under their reading, the millions of Americans who buy Toyotas could not
resell them without getting the permission of the copyright owner of every
item in that car which is copyrighted.”35 Olson replied that those buyers
might have other defenses, although he did not mention any of them.36
There is clearly a better answer. It is quite obvious that regardless of the
Court’s holding, buyers of Toyota will be able to resell their cars. Without
such a resale right these cars will lose much of their market value, and
Toyota should certainly be aware of that. For a somewhat similar reason,
Toyota makes its long-term warranty transferable,37 although it probably
has no legal obligation to do so. If the Court holds that a license is required
to resell a Toyota, it is highly likely that the company will provide such a
transferable license to every buyer.
Indeed, the discussion of the parade of horribles seems to sometimes
miss one of the insights of Coase’s “the problem of social costs”38—in
many cases, the market can fix legal inefficiencies. Coase showed that
while “[i]t was of course the view of the judges that they were affecting the
working of the economic system,”39 in many instances that is not the case.
Sometimes legal rules are just the starting point for another economic
interaction—in this case, steps to be taken by Toyota to protect its
customers’ rights.
C. How High Transaction Cost in Resale Markets Can Cause a
Real Parade of Horribles
If the parade of horribles argument identifies some natural cost of the
market segmentation system as “horrible” and ignores, in some other cases,
the market ability to fix some unfortunate situations, is there anything left
of that argument? The answer is yes. From an economic perspective the
main problem with the plaintiff’s argument is that it will increase the
transaction costs in resale markets.
Consider, for example, a library that just received a donation of books
and needs to decide if lending them to its patrons constitutes an
infringement of copyright. It might be very difficult to verify where the
books were printed. The analysis will suggest that, unlike the case of
Toyota, it is not clear that the publisher will make sure that the buyers have
34. Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 2, at 4, 59.
35. Transcript, supra note 5, at 28–29.
36. Id. at 29.
37. Used Toyota Warranty, TOYATA CERTIFIED USED VEHICLES, http://www.toyota
certified.com/warranty.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2013) (stating that the seven-year warranty
is “transferable at no cost, for added resale value”).
38. R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 8–15 (1960).
39. Id. at 10.
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a license to transfer the book and/or to lend it. Verifying the exact rights or
negotiating a license might be expensive. The same is true for Goodwill
when it receives donations or when any individual sells copyrighted goods
in a yard sale.
This increase in transaction costs can create several “horrible” situations
because high transaction costs are already a severe problem in our copyright
system that the Copyright Act does not properly address. The transaction
costs problem represents a real economic waste that the market cannot
easily solve.
This part explains how the core doctrinal structure of copyright law
seems to assume that transaction costs are low and that users can easily
negotiate licenses with copyright owners. It will show that these
assumptions were never accurate and that in recent years transaction costs
have risen even more. This creates real difficulties in reaching license
agreements as well as problems with innocent infringers. This part will
then show that the rule proposed by the plaintiff further increases
transaction costs by placing a heavier burden on users and by weakening
the ability of the first sale doctrine to reduce transaction costs.
1. The Problem of High Transaction Costs in Copyright Law
Copyright law creates broad property rights in intangible goods protected
by strict liability rules. A copyright owner can enforce her exclusive rights
without the need to prove intent or negligence by the alleged infringer.40
Indeed, copyright infringement can occur even if the infringer took all
reasonable steps to avoid infringement and even if the infringement was
subconscious.41 The law also provides the copyright owner with a powerful
set of remedies including statutory damages, impoundment, and
injunctions.42
Economic analysis of law literature has explored the conditions under
which such strong mechanisms should be used. This literature suggests that
entitlements should be protected by property rules when low transaction
costs allow the parties to reach voluntary transactions.43 Strict liability
40. CoStar Grp., Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d 780, 787 (D. Md. 2000); David
N. Weiskopf, The Risks of Copyright Infringement on the Internet: A Practitioner’s Guide,
33 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 13 (1998).
41. The most famous example of this kind of infringement is George Harrison
subconsciously copying The Chiffons’s He’s So Fine when composing My Sweet Lord.
ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1983).
42. 17 U.S.C. §§ 502–504 (2006). It should be noted that this full set of strong
mechanisms apply only with respect to direct liability. The liability regime with respect to
secondary infringers, such as those who provide a marketplace for secondary sellers (e.g.,
eBay) is more flexible. Indeed, in secondary liability cases, courts regularly consider issues
such as the reasonableness of the actions taken by the defendant. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1172–73 (9th Cir. 2007) (instructing the district court to
explore whether Google had “reasonable and feasible means” to stop infringements by its
users).
43. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1106–09 (1972).
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should be used primarily where the injurer/infringer has close to complete
control over the happening of the undesirable result44—in this case, the
infringement.
Copyright law does not fit this mold. On the one hand, in many cases it
is quite difficult for the users to figure out when a license is needed and,
therefore, innocent infringement is not uncommon. In addition, even if a
user believes that a license is needed, the transaction costs in securing such
a license might be significant. While some of those problems are inherent
to any property rights system in intangible goods,45 the elimination of many
copyright formalities in the United States and the extension in the length of
copyright protection, not only inflated the number of copyright protected
works but also increases the transaction costs in securing a license.46 Some
of the most difficult and pressing questions in copyright law nowadays,
including the problem of orphan works,47 result, to a large extent, from this
increase in transaction costs.
2. The Plaintiff’s Position, if Adopted, Is Expected To Exacerbate the
Problem of High Transaction Costs
Adopting the plaintiff’s position is expected to increase the transaction
costs in the resale market for two reasons. One is quite obvious: the
plaintiff’s position gives the copyright owner substantial control over resale
of copyright works manufactured abroad. Thus, the users of copyrighted
goods will need to waste transaction costs in verifying whether the good, or
any part of it, if protected by copyright, was manufactured abroad. The
second reason is that this position, by requiring a license, weakens one of
the mechanisms used by the Copyright Act to reduce transaction costs: the
first sale doctrine.
The first sale doctrine seems to promote efficiency and save transaction
costs by bundling together two rights that, in most cases, the parties, if
asked, would have chosen to buy and sell together: the personal property
right in the copy, including, for example, the right to destroy it, to store it,
or to mortgage it, and the right to transfer the copy. Exercising the right to
resale by the owner of the copy (e.g., by having a yard sale of the owner’s
book and CD collections) typically involves minimal transaction costs.
Exercising the right to resale by the copyright owner might entail
substantial costs because it will necessarily require cooperation between the
owner of the copy and the copyright owner, cooperation that will involve
44. Steven M. Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1980).
45. Thus, it is inherently more difficult to define borders (between the property of one
owner and another or the public) with respect to intangible goods (such as copyrighted
goods) than with respect to tangible goods such as land or personal property.
46. See generally Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV.
485 (2004).
47. Orphan works are those works whose copyright owner is unknown or difficult to
locate. Using these works in a way that requires a license is extremely difficult. See, e.g.,
Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, No. 11 CV-6351(HB), 2012 WL 4808939 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
10, 2012); Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 671 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
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transaction costs.48 In other words, in most cases, the copyright owners will
prefer to sell the copies of the work, in the initial sale, together with the
right of resale, because she can charge a higher price for such a product.49
Therefore, the plaintiff’s position, which limits the first sale doctrine and
places the burden of verifying the product’s origin on the user, increases
transaction costs even further. The market cannot typically fix this
problem, and this is where the buyers of Toyota and books depart. The
buyers of Toyota, who are about to spend a substantial amount, can
probably afford the transaction cost in verifying that they will be able to
resell their car before they purchase it. Car dealers will probably make sure
that this is possible, and they will be quick to point out to potential car
buyers if a certain car manufacturer will not guarantee this right. It is
unreasonable to expect a buyer of a book, a CD, or a T-shirt to spend a few
minutes exploring whether, in the future, she would be able to resell the
goods in a yard sale or donate them.50 Therefore, the plaintiff’s position, if
adopted, will hurt users and will create a harmful chilling effect on resale
markets and on public and nonprofit entities such as libraries.
IV. THE VIRTUES OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL’S BALANCED APPROACH
The previous parts of this Essay explored the weaknesses in the positions
of the defendant and the plaintiff in Kirtsaeng. The defendant’s position, if
adopted, will make geographic market segmentation difficult and thus
decrease the incentives to create. The plaintiff’s position, if adopted, will
increase transaction costs in resale markets, which will create an inefficient
chilling effect on these markets.
Therefore, this analysis seems to support a more balanced approach, and
it thus provides an economic justification to the position of the Solicitor
General. The Solicitor General urges the Court to adopt a position that
would allow the copyright owner to control importation of copyrighted
goods to the country but that would also limit such control once the items

48. A funny and effective example of such a negotiation was presented in a segment on
The Colbert Report in which Stephen Colbert and Elvis Costello agreed, after several
minutes of negotiation, that if Colbert sells a Costello record for one dollar in a garage sale,
he would pay Costello fourteen cents and a dented muffin tin. Judge, Jury & Executioner—
Copyright Law, COLBERT NATION (Nov. 26, 2012), http://www.colbertnation.com/thecolbert-report-videos/421501/november-26-2012/judge--jury---executioner---copyright-law.
49. See generally PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT 7:131 (3d ed. 2005 &
Supp. 2011) (suggesting that “[i]n the usual case, the copyright owner will have no interest
in undertaking the expense of . . . negotiations [every time the owner of a copy wishes to
resell it]”). In some cases, however, copyright owners do want to exercise control over the
resale market, usually in order to facilitate domestic market segmentation. These attempts,
typically accomplished by using certain licensing arrangements, sometimes result in legal
disputes. See, e.g., Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010). A full analysis
of these scenarios is beyond the scope of this Essay.
50. See generally Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, The New Servitudes, 96 GEO. L.J. 885,
914–15 (2008).
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are being sold in the United States.51 The Solicitor General justified this
result, which is similar to the result reached by the Ninth Circuit,52 by
relying on the language of the Copyright Act and Supreme Court precedents
but without fully appreciating its strength from a public policy perspective.
The distinction between the copyright owner’s control over importation
and her control over resale is economically justified. On one hand,
controlling importation is required in order to limit international arbitrage,
and thus it is crucial to the copyright owner’s ability to implement effective
geographic market segmentation. The increase in transaction costs from
this type of control is insignificant: most importers know that the goods
being imported are manufactured abroad and, in fact, there is a reasonable
chance that they are aware that their actions conflict with the copyright
owner’s attempt to segment the market. Moreover, importation is typically
not done in small quantities by uninformed laymen and the well-informed
professional importers typically know their legal rights and, as repeat large
players, can negotiate a license if needed. Therefore, high transaction costs
are typically not a major issue.
When it comes to resale markets the balance is different. These resale
markets include goods manufactured domestically and abroad, as well as
goods that include multiple parts manufactured in different countries. In
addition, many of the participants in these markets are individuals who are
engaged in this activity sporadically and on a small scale. Therefore, the
increase in transaction costs that would result from legally requiring a
license when reselling items manufactured abroad might be significant.
Moreover, if the copyright owner is granted control over importation,
efficient geographic market segmentation can be achieved without
necessarily controlling resale markets. Therefore, having a broad first sale
doctrine in this stage makes economic sense.
Thus, the interpretation of the Solicitor General and the Ninth Circuit
make sense from a public policy perspective:
geographic market
segmentation should be allowed but not if it means outlawing the innocent
resale of products manufactured abroad. Requiring a license from
importers but not from resellers achieves this goal.53
51. It is important to note that the Solicitor General did not argue that every resale in the
United States of items manufactured abroad is legal. Instead, he argued that “a copyright
owner who authorized the importation of foreign-made copies into the United States, and⁄or
authorized a first sale of the copies within this country, had exhausted his exclusive statutory
right to control the distribution.” Brief for the United States, supra note 15, at 27 (citations
omitted). Thus, this position does not eliminate the problem of innocent infringement in
resale markets, but it significantly mitigates it.
52. See Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 541 F.3d 982, 983 (9th Cir. 2008), aff’d
by an equally divided court, 131 S. Ct. 565 (2010).
53. Congress might be able to better address the issue, and it might be asked to do so by
the side that loses in the Supreme Court. There are many ways for Congress to do so. For
example, it can give copyright owners control over importation of items purchased abroad
but limit liability to defendants who knew or should have known that their actions defeat a
market segmentation plan. Such a solution, or a similar one, while not without difficulties,
will place liability on the likes of Kirtsaeng but not on innocent buyers. This solution, by
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departing from the strict liability framework of the Copyright Act, will also incentivize
copyright owners to convey valuable information to buyers, which in many cases will be
cheap to do (for example, the cover of John Wiley & Sons’s textbooks were marked with a
legend stating that they are to be sold only in a particular country or geographic region), and
which will allow buyers to accurately assess the value of the copies she is purchasing. A full
analysis of these possibilities is beyond the scope of this Essay.

